newsom criminal-justice policing george-floyd AB1506 use-of-force accountability reform-vs-rollback chokeholds warrior-training class-analysis #2020
related: CCPOA - The Prison Guard Donor and the Reform Ceiling | Criminal Justice - Donors and Backers | _Gavin Newsom Master Profile donors: CCPOA - California Correctional Peace Officers Association
The 2020 Moment
George Floyd was killed by Minneapolis police on May 25, 2020. The national uprising that followed forced every Democratic governor to take positions on policing reform. Newsom moved quickly on several measures, using executive action and signing legislation that passed in the reform window of 2020–2021. What he signed is real. What the outcomes have been, and what he didn’t do, is the record.
What He Signed — The Real Wins
AB 1506 (2020) — Authorized the California Attorney General to independently investigate officer-involved killings and use-of-force incidents. This created a state-level accountability mechanism independent of local prosecutors who are institutionally aligned with police departments. The AG has used this authority — it is a real structural change. Credit it.
Chokehold ban — Newsom signed legislation prohibiting carotid holds and chokeholds by California law enforcement statewide. This was genuine and direct.
“Warrior training” ban — Signed AB 66 prohibiting California law enforcement agencies from receiving certain types of military-style “warrior training” that critics argued cultivated a combat mentality among officers. Symbolic but real.
AB 3121 (2020) — Established California’s Task Force on Reparations for African Americans. Newsom signed it. This is relevant to criminal justice in the sense that mass incarceration’s racial dimensions are inseparable from the history the reparations task force is meant to address. The task force produced recommendations; Newsom has not acted on them. [See below]
Transparent use-of-force data reporting — Required California law enforcement agencies to report use-of-force incidents to the DOJ, creating a statewide database that didn’t previously exist in comprehensive form.
What Didn’t Happen
Reparations task force recommendations ignored. The task force Newsom created issued its final report in 2023, recommending direct payments and systemic reforms. Newsom responded by saying California couldn’t afford direct payments and signing a package of narrower symbolic measures. He created the process and declined to implement its conclusions. — CalMatters, 2024.
No meaningful qualified immunity reform. California did not eliminate qualified immunity for law enforcement officers — the legal doctrine that makes it extremely difficult to sue officers for civil rights violations. Newsom did not push for it. Qualified immunity is primarily a federal doctrine, but states can create parallel state liability standards. California did not.
No serious prosecution of officers. The AG’s investigation authority from AB 1506 has produced investigations but very few prosecutions. Officer accountability in California remains structurally difficult — district attorneys are locally elected and institutionally reluctant to prosecute fellow law enforcement.
The 2024 rollback dynamic. As crime became a political issue in 2023–2024, Newsom shifted his public posture. He supported Prop 36 opponents but his broader rhetoric on public safety moved rightward — more emphasis on accountability for offenders, less on police accountability. This mirrors the national Democratic Party’s post-2020 repositioning.
CCPOA’s Role in the Reform Limits
Law enforcement unions — CCPOA plus local police associations — are structurally opposed to accountability measures. The Police Officers Research Association of California (PORAC), the California State Sheriffs’ Association, and CCPOA all pushed back on 2020 reforms. CCPOA’s relationship with Newsom created a ceiling on how far reform could go, particularly on measures that would directly expose officers to accountability. [See: CCPOA - The Prison Guard Donor and the Reform Ceiling]
The Class Analysis
Policing in America is a class war instrument with a racial targeting mechanism. The people killed by police, the people arrested, the people prosecuted — they map almost perfectly onto the geography of poverty and race in California. Policing does not reduce crime in working-class communities; it manages, surveils, and criminalizes them. The reforms Newsom signed reduced some of the most visible abuses. They did not change the underlying function.
The test for whether policing reform is structural vs. symbolic: does it reduce the number of poor and Black and Latino people who are killed, arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated? The data on California after 2020 does not show a significant structural shift. The chokehold ban is real. The system that produces mass criminalization of poverty is intact.
Key Quotes
“There is no place in California for racism, bigotry, and police brutality.” — Newsom, June 2020, during the Floyd uprising.
“We need to invest in communities, not just in policing.” — Newsom, 2020.
[Prop 36 passed in 2024 with 68% of the vote, re-felonizing drug and theft offenses Prop 47 had decriminalized — with Newsom’s opposition being ineffective.]
Donation-to-Policy Timeline
| Date | Event/Contribution | Amount | Policy Action/Outcome | Time Gap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 (May) | George Floyd uprising begins | — | Newsom signs AB 1506 accountability measures | Same month |
| 2020 (Sept) | CCPOA contribution to Newsom campaign | $1.5M | Chokehold ban signed; AB 1506 ratified | Concurrent |
| 2021–2023 | CCPOA contributions total ~$1.75M | $1.75M | No qualified immunity reform; no officer prosecutions; CCPOA ceiling maintained | Ongoing |
| 2023 | Reparations task force final report released | — | Newsom rejects direct payments; minimal implementation | 3 years after commission |
| 2024 | CCPOA contribution to Prop 1 | $1M | Newsom opposes Prop 36 but opposition ineffective; 68% pass; police union backs tough-on-crime | Minimal lag |
Analytical Patterns
1. The Genuine Win + Structural Limit
Money
Genuine win: AB 1506 created independent AG investigation authority for officer-involved killings. This was real. The AG has used it. Credit it honestly.
Structural limit: Investigation authority without prosecution power or systemic change in district attorney incentives. The AG can investigate, but local DAs remain institutionally reluctant to prosecute fellow law enforcement. California did not eliminate qualified immunity. Police union opposition to accountability measures remains structurally protected because CCPOA funds governors and CCPOA’s institutional interest is maximum discretion for officers. The reform hit the ceiling the moment it threatened actual officer consequences.
2. The Villain Framing
The problem with Newsom’s policing rhetoric is how it distributes blame. The “warrior training” ban framed the problem as individual officers absorbing militarized ideology. The chokehold ban framed it as specific techniques. Both correct but incomplete. The structural issue — that California’s system is designed to manage and criminalize poverty in working-class and nonwhite communities, and that policing is the enforcement mechanism — never enters the discussion. By making the problem technique-focused or training-focused, Newsom can sign reforms that reduce the most visible abuses while the system function remains intact.
3. The Two-Audience Problem
Contradiction
Newsom’s public stance: “There is no place in California for racism, bigotry, and police brutality.” Language of accountability and structural change.
Newsom’s private constraint: CCPOA is a major donor, local prosecutors and police are institutional allies in his administration, and the carceral system remains his primary policy tool for managing the political consequences of poverty and inequality.
The resolution: Sign reforms that sound transformative but maintain the underlying system. The reparations task force receives symbolic backing but no funding. Officer prosecution remains locally blocked. The police union’s interests remain protected. He can tell progressives about AB 1506 and tell law enforcement about what didn’t happen.
4. The Pilot Program
Newsom has positioned criminal justice reform as a local/county function. This allows state-level credit-taking while maintaining plausible deniability for local failures. “We gave you the tools (AB 1506)” becomes the position. “If your DA isn’t prosecuting officers, that’s a local problem” removes state accountability. The reforms are real at the state level; implementation failures are local. This distribution of responsibility allows Newsom to claim the win without owning the limits.
Sources
- California Assembly Bill 1506: Independent investigation of officer-involved deaths (Tier 1)
- CalMatters: California’s moment of reckoning on police accountability (Tier 2)
- CalMatters: Two historic California reparations bills stall out (Tier 2)
- LA Times: Newsom signs policing reform package 2020 (Tier 2)
- CalMatters: Prop 36 passes overwhelmingly (Tier 2)
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